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Abstract 
Episodic memory has been tested in non-human animals using depletion paradigms 
that assess recollection for the “what,” “where” and “when” (i.e., how long ago). This 
paradigm has not been used with human children, yet doing so would provide another 
means to explore their episodic memory development. Using a depletion paradigm, 
preschool-aged children were presented in two trials with a preferred food that was 
only edible after a short interval and a less preferred food that was edible after the 
short and long intervals. Younger (mean= 40 months) and older (mean=65 months) 
children tended to choose their preferred food after the short intervals, but did not 
switch to selecting their less-preferred food after the long intervals. Importantly, their 
choices did not differ with age. Although older children better remembered “what”, 
“where” and “what is where” than did younger children, neither age group 
successfully estimated “how long ago” an event occurred. Finally, both age groups 
spontaneously recalled information about Trial 1. We also analyzed the relation 
between the different measures used in the study but no clear patterns emerged. 
Results are discussed with respect to the cognitive mechanisms necessary to succeed 
in depletion paradigms and the measurement of episodic memory more broadly.  
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Did the Popsicle Melt? 
Preschoolers’ Performance in an Episodic-like Memory Task 
 
Memory is an essential aspect of cognition. The content of our recollections, how this 
content is accessed and the length of time we remember this content are some of the 
many features that define different types of memory systems (Miyashita, 2004; 
Squire, 1992). The episodic/semantic distinction is one of the most influential in 
memory research because it distinguishes memories based on their content (e.g., what 
I did during my last holiday) and on how this content is accessed (e.g., awareness) 
(Tulving, 1972).  Tulving (1972) originally defined semantic memory as our database 
of knowledge about the world, including words, objects, places, people and their 
inter-relationships. In contrast, episodic memory was defined as memory for 
“temporally dated episodes or events, and the temporal-spatial relations” among them 
(Tulving 1972, p. 385). In terms of content, episodic memory was thus described as 
the what, where and when of a specific event. For example, when we state that 
Newcastle is in the North of England, we are drawing on semantic memory; however, 
when I remember walking along the Tyne River with a friend last summer, I am 
drawing on episodic memory. This distinction originally focused on the different 
types of information processed by the two systems: unique spatial–temporal contexts 
for episodic memory and facts and concepts for semantic memory.   
More recently, Tulving (1983) has argued that the critical distinction lies less 
in memory content and more in the type of phenomenological experience associated 
with the memory. Accordingly, he suggested that autonoetic consciousness is a 
defining property of episodic memory and is expressed in experiences of mental time 
travel or, in the mental reconstruction of previous personal experiences at which one 
was present (see also Suddendorf & Busby, 2005; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007). 
Nonetheless, this ability still presupposes that the individual can retrieve the spatial-
temporal context in which the to-be-remembered event occurred. As such, spatial-
temporal context remains a critical component of episodic memory. In contrast, noetic 
consciousness is associated with semantic memory and does not require mentally 
traveling back in time but, rather, an awareness of familiarity or knowing. 
Research on episodic memory in human adults has mainly relied on the use of 
verbal tasks. In these tasks, participants are asked to describe the content of a memory 
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and the subjective experience (i.e., type of awareness) associated with remembering 
this content (e.g., Buckner & Carroll, 2007; Levine, Svoboda, Hay, Winocur, & 
Moscovitch, 2002). The use of verbal approaches for studying the development of 
episodic memory has shown that even very young children remember past events 
(e.g., Bauer, 1996; Busby & Suddendorf, 2005; Meltzoff, 1995; Nelson, 1988). For 
example, 2-year-olds can describe “what” happened to them several months earlier 
and by the age of 3 begin to talk about events that took place more than 12 months 
before (e.g., Fivush, 2011; Peterson, 2012 for reviews). Importantly, this research has 
also demonstrated that young children remember information about the spatial 
component of past events (e.g., see Bauer, 2007, and Pathman & St. Jacques, 2014, 
for reviews). For instance, by age 3, children can provide some information about 
“where” (e.g., a park) a particular event took place when describing personal past 
events (e.g., Bauer & Larkina, 2014). Recently, Bauer, Stewart, White, and Larkina 
(2016) showed that 4-year-olds not only succeeded at identifying “where” the events 
happened but also at binding “what” they did “where.”  
As for the temporal aspect, although infants are capable of sequencing actions 
within a particular event (e.g., Bauer, Wenner, Dropik, & Wewerka, 2000), ordering 
events on conventional timelines is a more challenging ability that emerges later in 
development (e.g., Friedman, 2003). In a recent study using such conventional 
timescales, Pathman, Larkina, Burch, and Bauer (2013) showed that 6- and 8-year-
olds, but not 4-year-olds, accurately judged the order of two particular personal past 
events (see also Pathman, Doydum, & Bauer, 2013, for similar findings). However, 
these tasks do not necessarily tap into the phenomenological experience associated 
with the recollection of past events. As such, the use of verbal tasks to investigate the 
phenomenology of episodic memory (i.e., autonoetic awareness) still poses a 
challenge for developmental researchers.    
Comparative psychologists are faced with similar problems because non-
human animals cannot verbalize the subjective experience associated with the 
recollection of a past event. It is thus challenging to design tasks that successfully 
distinguish animals’ episodic memories from animals’ semantic memories (though 
see Clayton & Russell, 2009, for a “ Kantian minimalist” approach in which it is 
argued that re-experiencing an event can be empirically assessed by using 
perspective-taking and spatial-orientation paradigms). In an attempt to overcome this 
limitation, Clayton and Dickinson (1998) developed one of the most influential 
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approaches to test episodic memory in non-human animals: the episodic-like memory 
depletion paradigm or, the “what-where-when” paradigm. Based on Tulving’s 
original definition of episodic memory (Tulving, 1972), Clayton and Dickinson tested 
whether scrub-jays could remember what type of food they cached, where they 
cached it, and when (i.e., how long ago) they cached it. Because the authors 
acknowledged that their paradigm did not directly assess the phenomenological 
component of the scrub-jays’ memories, they referred to it as an “episodic-like” 
memory paradigm.   
In Clayton and Dickinson’s experiment (Clayton & Dickinson, 1998), scrub-
jays (Aphelocoma californica) cached two types of food: preferred, but perishable, 
wax worms and less-preferred, but non-perishable, peanuts. When recovering their 
caches, scrub-jays searched for worms if only a short time had passed, but switched to 
peanuts if a long time had elapsed since caching. Thus, birds successfully recalled the 
type of food they had cached (i.e., “what”), its location (i.e., “where”), and how long 
ago (i.e., “when”) they had cached it (Clayton & Dickinson, 1998). Consequently, 
these results were taken as evidence that scrub-jays had episodic-like memories. 
Several studies using a similar depletion paradigm have now shown that other birds 
(Feeney, Roberts, & Sherry, 2009; Zinkivskay, Nazir, & Smulders, 2009), rodents 
(Babb & Crystal, 2006; Bird, Roberts, Abroms, & Crupi, 2003; Ferkin, Combs, del 
Barco-Trillo, Pierce, & Franklin, 2007), and great apes (Martin-Ordas, Haun, 
Colmenares, & Call, 2010) also recall the what-where-when of past events.  
However, episodic-like memory tasks differ from episodic memory tasks in 
three important ways: (1) episodic-like memory tasks do not necessarily assess 
autonoetic awareness (i.e., conscious recollection)—a defining feature of episodic 
memory; (2) the “how long ago” component does not necessarily test chronosthesia 
or, “…individuals’ awareness of the temporal dimension of their own and others’ 
existence…” (Tulving, 2002, p. 313), which Tulving argued was critical to episodic 
memory; and, (3) episodic memories are usually encoded in a single trial, whereas 
episodic-like memory tasks require training and thus involve more than one exposure 
to the event. Together, these factors have led some authors to argue that episodic-like 
memory tasks might rely on semantic, rather than episodic, memory (e.g., Suddendorf 
& Busby, 2005; Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007).  
Until recently, however, depletion paradigms had not been used with humans 
(either adults or children). This is surprising given that data on this task with children, 
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especially, may shed light on the extent to which episodic memory is needed to 
succeed.  More specifically, if passing a what-where-when depletion task relies on 
episodic memory, then older children should outperform younger children given 
previous findings that show substantial improvement in children’s recollection skills 
between 3 and 5 years of age (e.g., Busby & Suddendorf, 2005; Clayton & Russell, 
2009; Quon & Atance, 2010).  In contrast, if succeeding on this paradigm largely 
relies on semantic memory (or other “non-episodic” processes), then children as 
young as 3 should pass and age differences should be less likely. This is because even 
3-year-olds show well-developed semantic memory abilities (e.g., Hudson, 1990; 
Nelson, 1988). In fact, a recent study showed that 3-year-olds performed as well as 4-
year-olds in a problem-solving situation in which only semantic memory was required 
to succeed (Martin-Ordas, Atance & Call, 2014).  
Interestingly, two recent studies showed that human adults and children as 
young as 3 recalled what, where, and when something happened (Hayne & Imuta, 
2011; Holland & Smulders, 2011). In these studies, participants were asked to recall 
in which room (i.e., “where”) and in which order (i.e., “when”) toys (Hayne & Imuta, 
2011) or coins (Holland & Smulders, 2011) (i.e., “what”) were hidden. There are two 
important differences, however, between these two studies and Clayton and 
Dickinson’s (1998) depletion paradigm. First, the definition of the “when” component 
is not the same across studies. In the studies with human children and adults, the 
“when” component is defined as the “order” in which the hiding events took place, 
whereas in the studies with the scrub-jays, it is defined as “how long ago” a past event 
took place (hereafter, we thus refer to the paradigm developed by Clayton and 
Dickinson as “what-where-how long ago”). Second, the behavioral criteria used to 
assess episodic memory also differ across both sets of studies. Clayton and Dickinson 
(1998) assessed scrub jays’ episodic memories by measuring their correct choices 
(i.e., choosing worms after the short retention interval and peanuts after the long 
retention interval). In contrast, adults’ and children’s episodic memories were 
measured by their responses to the “what” (e.g., coins), “where” (e.g., in which room) 
and “when” (e.g., order in which the coins were hidden) questions. As such, we do 
not know whether children would pass a what-where-how long ago task because the 
“when” component has been assessed differently in the animal and human research.   
To address this issue, we combined the methods used by Clayton and 
Dickinson (1998) with those recently used with humans (Hayne & Imuta, 2011; 
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Holland & Smulders, 2011) to determine whether pre-school children not only encode 
information about “what” was hidden “where”, but also “how long ago.” Our task 
entailed the experimenter hiding food in two of three locations on a platform. One 
location contained a favourite but perishable food (grape popsicle) and the other a 
less-preferred but non-perishable food (box of raisins). The third location remained 
empty. Children were asked to choose from one of the three locations (i.e., children 
were told that they could have what was under their chosen box) after a 3-min or 1-
hour retention interval (RI) and to answer different memory questions about “what” 
we hid, “where” we hid it, and “how long ago” we hid it. After 3 minutes, the 
popsicle was still edible, whereas after 1 hour it was not (i.e., it had melted and 
become inedible).  
As mentioned earlier, subjects’ choice (e.g., worms or peanuts) after the RIs is 
the dependent variable used to assess episodic-like memory in non-human animals 
whereas, with humans, verbal responses to the “memory check” questions (i.e., 
“what,” “where,” and “in which order”) are the commonly used dependent variables. 
Although Hayne and Imuta (2011) also used a behavioural measure to assess whether 
children remembered “where” (i.e., children had to find the toys hidden in the rooms) 
and “in which order” (e.g., children were asked to enter the rooms in the order in 
which they experienced them before) the toys were hidden, the “what” component of 
children’s memories could not be assessed behaviourally. Importantly, there was no 
measure of whether or not children can use duration to inform their item choices (e.g., 
choose the preferred food after a short interval and the less preferred food after a long 
interval) - this being a key dependent measure in the animal literature and one that we 
also wished to assess. In sum, our paradigm allowed us to obtain both dependent 
variables; that is, participants’ choices after the RIs and their verbal responses to the 
memory check questions. As noted earlier, because research has shown that episodic 
memory shows important developments between ages 3 and 5 we predicted that older 
children would perform better than younger children in our what-where-how long ago 
task.   
Our study also entailed two experimental trials. Trial 1 allowed us to 
determine how children performed when they were unaware of what the task would 
involve [or, the element of “surprise” (Zentall, Clement, Bhatt, & Allen, 2001)]. We 
wanted to capture this notion of surprise because it has been argued that a crucial 
feature of episodic memory is that retrieval can occur when encoding is incidental and 
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memory assessment is unexpected (Singer & Zentall, 2007; Zentall, Singer, & 
Stagner, 2008; Zentall et al., 2001; Zhou & Crystal, 2011). Trial 2 thus allowed us to 
assess the effect of previous experience on participants’ performance, with the 
prediction that those children who received the 1-hour RI in Trial 1 (i.e., experienced 
the melted popsicle) should perform better on the 1-hour RI in Trial 2 than those 
children who received the 3-min RI in Trial 1. Similarly, if experiencing the “what”, 
“where” and “how long ago” questions in Trial 1 facilitates subsequent encoding of 
this information then children should perform better on these questions in Trial 2, as 
compared to Trial 1.  
Because Trial 2 took place in the exact same context as Trial 1, this created a 
situation in which direct retrieval (Conway, 2005) could be tested.  Research with 
human adults has shown that memories of personal past events (i.e., episodic 
memory) can either be retrieved through an effortful process that involves 
strategically searching for a particular episodic memory—so called generative 
retrieval- or can be triggered effortlessly and spontaneously by internal (e.g., hunger) 
or external (e.g., a room) cues —or, so called direct retrieval (Conway, 2005; Conway 
& Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). In contrast to generative retrieval, direct retrieval—also 
referred to as cue-dependent retrieval- is argued to emerge earlier in development 
because it requires less executive control (Berntsen, 2009; Raby & Clayton, 2009). 
Previous research has shown that it is only relatively late in development that children 
start to use retrieval strategies (Brown, Bransford, Ferrara, & Campione, 1983; 
Schneider & Bjorklund, 1998) and thus younger children are reported to benefit from 
being provided with external cues (Gee & Pipe, 1995). For example, Gordon and 
Follmer (1994) asked 3-, 5- and 7-year-olds to remember details about a doctor’s 
check-up. Those children who were tested in a room that resembled the one where the 
actual check-up took place recalled more information and more details about this past 
event than those children who were assessed with a regular verbal protocol. This was 
especially true of the 3-year olds. Due to the high degree of cue overlap between our 
two trials, we were curious about whether even 3-year-olds (during their second visit 
to the laboratory) might spontaneously retrieve memories about their personal past 
experiences in Trial 1.  
In sum, we expected older children to outperform younger children both at 
making the correct choices (i.e., choosing the popsicle after a short RI and the raisins 
after a long RI) in our depletion paradigm and responding correctly to the memory 
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check questions (i.e., “what,” “where,” and “how long ago”). We also expected all 
children to perform better in the second trial compared to the first - both in terms of 
correct choices and responses to the memory check questions. Moreover, participants’ 
correct choices in Trial 2 should be influenced by the type of trial they received first. 
As for spontaneous recall, given that cue overlap between encoding and retrieval 
facilitates direct retrieval—and this is particularly true for younger children— we 
expected that during the second trial both younger and older children would retrieve 
memories of the previous event (i.e., Trial 1). This would suggest that when presented 
with appropriate cues (e.g., rooms where children were tested in Trial 1) even 
younger children spontaneously remember past events. Finally, if our three measures 
(i.e., correct choices, responses to the memory check questions, and direct 
retrieval/spontaneous recall in Trial 2) reflect the same memory abilities (i.e., episodic 
memory), then performances on them should be related. Examining this relation is a 
particularly novel contribution of our methodology given that no studies have 
addressed whether these different episodic memory measures tap similar processes in 
young children.   
 
Methods 
Participants 
Of the 84 typically-developing children who were recruited, 36 were excluded 
because they preferred raisins to popsicles, disliked raisins, or failed to attend both 
sessions (i.e., Trials 1 and 2). Our final sample included 48 children (27 females; 21 
males, M=51 months) divided into younger (M=40 months, range=36 to 52 months, 
n=24) and older (M=65 months, range=58 to 71, n=24) age groups to allow us to test 
our developmental predictions.  All participants were predominantly White, middle 
class, and fluent in English. Our experiment received ethical approval from the Office 
of Research Ethics and Integrity at the University of Ottawa. Parents provided written 
informed consent for their children’s participation and children also provided their 
verbal assent.  
 
Materials and Procedure 
The apparatus consisted of three distinct cardboard boxes (approximately 12 
cm wide x 19 cm long x 8.8 cm high each) and a wooden platform (91 cm long x 75.5 
cm wide) in which three holes (5 cm diameter) were drilled and then covered with a 
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plastic netting (see Figure 1). The netting allowed liquid (from the melting popsicle) 
to pass through and collect inside a cup that was hidden under the platform.  
Experimenter (E) and participant sat facing each other. E placed the three boxes on 
the platform about 20 cm apart, showed the participant two food rewards, and then 
placed them under two of the three boxes. The experiment took place in two rooms: 
Room 1 and Room 2. The hiding event took place in Room 1 and then participants 
waited 3 min or 1 hour, depending on trial type, in Room 2.  
 
 
------------------------------- 
Figure 1 
------------------------------- 
 
Each of the two trials consisted of five main events: (1) food preference test, 
(2) hiding event, (3) critical choice question, (4) memory check questions and, (5) 
“how long ago” question. In addition, for Trial 2 only, children’s direct/spontaneous 
recall was assessed. 
1. Food preference test.  The box of raisins (4.6 cm long x 3.4 cm wide x 1.7 cm 
high) and the popsicle (3 cm long x 2.5 cm wide x 1.5 cm high) were placed on two 
small dishes and children were asked “Which one of these two snacks do you like best: 
popsicles or raisins?” At this point in the procedure, participants did not receive 
either food item.  The preference test was then followed by the hiding event. 
2. Hiding event. For each of the two snacks E said: “Look what I have here! I am 
going to put it here”. E then placed the popsicle in one location, the raisins in another, 
while the third box remained empty. This empty box allowed us to control for 
children at least remembering which boxes had food under them1. Children received 
either a 3-min trial or a 1-hour trial. The 3-min and 1-hour designations refer to the 
length of time that elapsed between hiding the food items and allowing participants to 
choose one of the boxes (i.e., critical choice). On the 3-min trials, the popsicle and 
raisins were both available (i.e., edible), whereas on the 1-hour trial the popsicle 
melted and only the raisins were edible. During the RIs, children went to Room 2 and 
                                                 
1 Note that only 2 older children chose the empty box in Trial 1—one of them in the 
1-hour trial and the other one in the 3-min trial- and 1 younger child did so in Trial 2 
(1-hour trial). 
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participated in a series of unrelated activities with E. Importantly, before leaving 
Room 1, E clearly stated “the door is going to be locked so no one can go inside the 
room while we are not there”.  
3. Critical choice question. After the 3-min or 1-hour RI, E and participant returned to 
Room 1 and E asked the child the critical choice question, “Now you can have what is 
inside one of these boxes. Which one are you going to choose?” This question is akin 
to scrub jays, for example, being allowed to retrieve a particular food (e.g., peanuts or 
wax worms) after a specified RI. In the 1-hour trials, after the box was uncovered and 
children had been asked the memory check questions (see below), E asked participants 
“What happened to the popsicle?” The majority of children stated that the popsicle 
had melted thus suggesting that they understood the melting process.  Nonetheless, 
for all children, E explained or confirmed that the popsicle had indeed melted.  
4. Memory check questions. Children were also asked three memory-check questions 
to assess whether they remembered “what” (“Do you remember what I put under the 
boxes?”), “where” (“Do you remember which boxes have something under them?”) 
and “what is where” (“Do you remember where the popsicle is? Do you remember 
where the raisins are?”). These questions are similar to those asked in the studies with 
adults and children described earlier in our Introduction. Note, that half of the 
participants were asked the critical choice question first and the memory-check 
questions second, whereas for the other half this order was reversed. Importantly, the 
order in which we asked these questions did not significantly affect younger 
children’s performance (Trial 1: 2= 2.59, df=1, p=.21; Trial 2: 2=2.24, df=1, p=.21) 
or older children’s performance (Trial 1: 2= 2.25, df=1, p=.21; Trial 2: 2= 1.73, 
df=1, p=.24). Once participants indicated the location/box they wanted to uncover and 
answered the memory check questions, E lifted the chosen box to allow them to have 
what was inside. 
5. How long ago question. This question was always asked at the end of the trial and 
was worded as follows: “Do you remember when we were in the other room (i.e., 
Room 2)? Did it feel like the time that it takes to brush your teeth, or like the time that 
it takes your Mom to make dinner and then eat dinner all together?” E pointed to two 
pictures while presenting these two different options: one depicted a small child 
brushing her teeth and the other depicted a woman cooking with her family having 
dinner in the background. In addition, two lines were drawn under each of the two 
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pictures: a short line for “brushing teeth,” and a longer line for “making and eating 
dinner.” The “how long ago” question was a novel feature of our paradigm and 
allowed us to determine whether children’s incorrect responses on the critical choice 
question (e.g., choosing the popsicle after a 1-hour RI) was due to difficulties 
estimating the amount of time/duration that had elapsed between the hiding and 
retrieval events.  
Children received two trials separated by five to seven days. Half received the 
3-min trial followed by either the 3-min trial or 1-hour trial. The other half received 
the 1-hour trial followed by either the 3-min or 1-hour trial resulting in 4 experimental 
conditions, with equal numbers of older and younger children in each: 1-hour (first) 
trial and 1-hour (second) trial; 1-hour trial and 3-min trial; 3-min trial and 3-min trial; 
3-min trial and 1-hour trial. This combination of conditions allowed us to address 
whether (or not) experiencing the melted popsicle in Trial 1 significantly improved 
performance in Trial 2. Children were randomly assigned to each of the conditions 
until the required number of children in each condition was met. Hiding locations and 
box locations were counterbalanced within and across participants.  
 
Scoring and Analyses 
Trials were video-recorded and participants’ choices were scored as a function 
of which box they pointed to first (correct box=1; incorrect box=0).  
Critical Choice Question. In keeping with previous literature using depletion 
paradigms, choosing the box hiding the popsicle in the 3-min trials was considered 
“correct” because it is the preferred food and is still edible, whereas choosing the 
empty box or the box with raisins were considered “incorrect”. In contrast, in the 1-
hour trials, choosing the box hiding the raisins was considered “correct,” whereas 
choosing the empty box or the box hiding the popsicle (which was no longer edible) 
were considered “incorrect.”   
Memory-check Questions (“What”, “Where”, “What is Where”). Participants 
received a score of 1 for the “what” question (i.e., “Do you remember what I put 
under the boxes?”) if they responded with both “popsicle” and “raisins.” Any other 
response was scored as 0. Participants received a score of 1 for the “where” question 
(i.e., “Do you remember which boxes have something under them?”) if they pointed at 
the two boxes that contained the food items. Any other response was scored as 0. For 
the “what is where” question (i.e., “Do you remember where the popsicle is? Do you 
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remember where the raisins are?”), participants received a score of 1 if they pointed 
at the box containing the popsicle and at the box containing the raisins. Any other 
response was scored as 0.  
“How Long Ago” Question. For the “how long ago” question (i.e., “Do you remember 
when we were in the other room?: Did it feel like the time that it takes to brush your 
teeth or like the time that it takes your Mom to make dinner and then eat dinner all 
together?”), participants received a score of 1 if they answered “brushing teeth” after 
the 3-min trial and “making and eating dinner” after the 1-hour trial.   
Direct/Spontaneous Recall. For the second trial only, we coded children’s 
spontaneous utterances about the events that took place during Trial 1. Utterances 
were either classified as being “central” (e.g., remembering that the popsicle melted), 
or “peripheral” (e.g., remembering the door being locked) to the past event. Note that 
E never prompted these memories. We calculated four scores: overall/total 
spontaneous recollection (i.e., total number of central memories + total number of 
peripheral memories), total number of central memories, total number of peripheral 
memories, and a categorical score that reflected whether children spontaneously 
recalled information or not (i.e., either central features or peripheral features) about 
Trial 1 (recall=1, no recall=0). We began coding children’s utterances as soon as 
children entered Room 1 at the beginning of Trial 2 and ended our coding 
immediately prior to E asking the test questions (i.e., critical choice question and 
memory-check questions in Room 1).  
Reliability Analyses. A second coder blind to the hypotheses coded 23% of the trials. 
Reliability was 100% for the critical choice question, memory-check questions, and 
how long ago question.  Kappa was also fairly high (.74) for the spontaneous recall 
measure. All disagreements were resolved through discussion and the scoring criteria 
revised. These revised criteria were then used to score the remaining 77% of the data.  
Analyses. We used Pearson chi-square tests to analyze children’s performance in the 
critical choice question in Trial 1, their performance in the critical choice question in 
Trial 2 as a function of what type of trial they received first, and the effect of age. We 
used binomial tests to assess whether children were above chance in the critical 
choice question (chance=33%). We used Mann-Whitney tests to analyze the effects of 
age on spontaneous recall and to analyze the effect of Trial 1 (i.e., 3 min or 1 hour RI) 
on spontaneous recall. Wilcoxon tests were used to analyze which features of the 
event (central or peripheral) children remembered most. Finally, we used the 
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contingency coefficient to analyze the relation between children’s performance on the 
critical choice question and memory-check questions in each trial. For Trial 2, we also 
calculated the contingency coefficient for children’s performance on the critical 
choice question and direct/spontaneous retrieval (hereafter referred to as “spontaneous 
recall”) and the memory-check questions and spontaneous recall. All statistical tests 
were exact two-tailed and results were considered significant if p<.05. 
 
Results 
Critical Choice Question 
Performance in Trial 1. Recall that participants were either given a 3-min RI or a 1-
hour RI in Trial 1. Whereas choosing the box containing the “popsicle” is the correct 
choice in the 3-min RI, the box hiding the “raisins” is the correct choice in the 1-hour 
RI. There were no differences in performance between the younger children and older 
children in either the 3-min RI (2= 3.55, df=1, p=.155), or the 1-hour RI (2= .253, 
df=1, p=1). More specifically, both younger and older children tended to correctly 
choose the box hiding the popsicle in the 3-min RI (91 % of younger children vs. 60% 
of older children) and incorrectly choose it in the 1-hour RI (84% of younger children 
vs. 75% of older children). Because age did not significantly affect children’s 
responses to the critical choice question, we collapsed the data to conduct chance 
analyses for both the 3-min and 1-hour RIs. Binomial tests revealed that whereas 
children chose the box hiding the popsicle significantly above chance after 3 min 
(p<.001), they did not choose the box hiding the raisins significantly above chance 
after 1 hour (p=.292). Rather, 83 % of the children chose the box hiding the popsicle, 
which is more often than expected by chance (p<.001).  
Performance in Trial 2 as a Function of Trial 1. To investigate the effect of previous 
experience on children’s responses, we analyzed performance in Trial 2 as a function 
of the trial children received first (Figure 2). These analyses were run separately for 
younger and older children. For the younger children, performance in the second 1-
hour trial was not superior for those children who received the 1-hour trial first as 
compared to those who received the 3-min trial first (2= .000, df=1, p=1). Similarly, 
performance in the second 3-min trial was not affected by whether children received a 
3-min or 1-hour RI in Trial 1 (2= .000, df=1, p=1). As was the case with younger 
children, having received the 1-hour RI or 3-min RI in the first trial did not affect 
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older children’s performance in the second 1-hour trial (2= .000, df=1, p=1) or in the 
second 3-min trial (2= 6.00, df=1, p=.061). Together these results show that 
children’s choices in Trial 2 were not significantly affected by their experience in 
Trial 1. Especially surprising in this respect was that experiencing the melted popsicle 
in Trial 1 (i.e., 1-hour RI) did not lead children to make significantly more correct 
choices after experiencing this same RI in Trial 2 (this, as compared to children who 
received the 3-min RI in Trial 1).  
Collapsing across age groups to compare children’s performance to chance 
levels yielded the following results: Children correctly chose the box hiding the 
popsicle significantly above chance in Trial 2 of the 3 min-3 min condition (p=.008) 
but, unexpectedly, not in Trial 2 of the 1 hour-3 min condition (p=.718). Importantly, 
however, children did not correctly choose the box hiding the raisins significantly 
above chance in either Trial 2 of the 3 min-1 hour condition (p=.806) or Trial 2 of the 
1 hour-1 hour condition (p=.806) (Figure 2). Instead, children in both of these 
conditions chose the popsicle significantly above chance (p=.016 and p=.008, 
respectively).  
Children’s failure to correctly choose the popsicle in Trial 2 of the 1 hour-3 
min condition suggests that children who experienced the melted popsicle in Trial 1 
(i.e., 1-hour RI) may then have avoided choosing the box hiding the popsicle after the 
3-min RI in Trial 2. However, it is then surprising that children who received the 1 
hour-1 hour condition did not do the same. Instead, as noted above, children were 
significantly above chance in choosing the box hiding the popsicle after the 1-hour RI 
in Trial 2. Moreover, 73% of those children who first received the 3-min RI in Trial 1 
continued to choose the popsicle after the 1-hour RI in Trial 2 (p=.016) and those 
children who received the 3min-3min condition continued to choose the popsicle in 
Trial 2, with only 25% of them choosing the box containing the raisins (p=.806). We 
will return to this issue in the Discussion.     
 
------------------------------- 
Figure 2 
------------------------------- 
 
Memory-check Questions (“What”, “Where”, “What Is Where”)  
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Recall that children were asked a series of questions assessing “what” (i.e., 
“Do you remember what I put under the boxes?”), “where” (i.e., “Do you remember 
which boxes have something under them?”), and “what is where” (i.e., “Do you 
remember where the popsicle is? Do you remember where the raisins are?”). Our 
next set of analyses addressed whether younger and older children differed in the 
extent to which they remembered these various pieces of information. 
Performance in Trial 1. Older children better remembered “what” (2= 6.00, df=1, 
p=.030; 50 % of younger children vs. 83% of older children) and “what is where” 
(2= 6.70, df=1, p=.023; 66% of younger children vs. 95% of older children) than 
younger children. In contrast, there were no significant differences on the “where” 
question (2= 3.63, df=1, p=.111; 58% of younger children vs. 83% of older children).  
Performance in Trial 2. As compared to younger children, older children better 
remembered “what is where” (2= 8.08, df=1, p=.010; 62% of younger children vs. 
95% of older children), but not “what” (2= 0.35, df=1, p=1; 91% of younger children 
vs. 95% of older children), or “where” (2= 4.54, df=1, p=.072; 66% of younger 
children vs. 91% of older children).  
How Long Ago Question 
Recall that children were asked a final question (i.e., “Do you remember when 
we were in the other room? Did it feel like the time that it takes to brush your teeth, or 
like the time that it takes your Mom to make dinner and then eat dinner all 
together?”) to assess their estimation of the amount of time that had passed between 
the hiding and retrieval events. Interestingly, there were no significant age differences 
on this question on either Trial 1 (2= 2.37, df=1, p=.212; 54% of younger children vs. 
75% of older children), or Trial 2 (2= .000, df=1, p=1; 76% of younger children vs. 
75% of older children). In fact, older children were only above chance in estimating 
the correct duration of the second 3-min trial (Binomial test p<.05). For all other 
trials, both younger and older children’s performance was not significantly different 
from chance.      
Spontaneous Recall During Trial 2 
Thirty (65%) of the 462 children spontaneously recalled features of the event 
they experienced the week before (mean=1.32, SEM=.18, n=46). Moreover, we found 
                                                 
2 Videos of the second session were unavailable for two of the children and so coding 
of their spontaneous recall was not possible.  
EPISODIC-LIKE MEMORY 
 17 
no differences in spontaneous recall between younger and older children (Mann-
Whitney test: U=206, p=.18, nyounger=23, nolder=23; younger children: mean=1.00, 
SEM=.25, n= 23; older children: mean=1.56, SEM=.27, n=23). Children tended to 
spontaneously recall more information when they had experienced the 1-hour trial 
(and therefore the popsicle melting) than when they had experienced the 3-min trial 
(Mann-Whitney test: U=183.5, p=.06, n3min=22, n1h=24; 3 min: mean=1.00, SEM=.27, 
n= 22; 1 hour: mean=1.62, SEM=.25, n=24) the week before. Although we did not 
find significant differences between the number of central (e.g., popsicle melting) and 
peripheral (e.g., locking the door) features that children retrieved about the event 
(Wilcoxon test: T=13.19, p=.58, n=27), children tended to spontaneously recall more 
central features when they had experienced the 1-hour trial the week before than when 
they had experienced the 3-min trial (Mann-Whitney test: U=190, p=.07, n3min=22, 
n1h=24) the week before. No differences in recall of the peripheral features of the 
event were found (Mann-Whitney test: U=220, p=.29, n3min=22, n1h=24).  
Relation between the Critical Choice Question, the Memory-check and “How Long 
Ago” Questions, and Spontaneous Recall 
Performance in Trial 1. Performance in the critical choice question was not 
significantly related to remembering “what” (C=.029, p=1, n=48), “where” (C=.065, 
p=.756, n=48), “how long ago” (C=.017, p=.912, n=45) or to the ability to bind “what 
is where” (C=.139, p=.466, n=48).  
Performance in Trial 2. Similar to Trial 1, correctly responding to the critical choice 
question was not significantly related to remembering “what” (C=.213, p=.131, 
n=48), “where” (C=.086, p=.548, n=48), “what is where” (C=.187, p=.186, n=48) or 
to the ability to spontaneously recall events from the week before (C=.248, p=.082, 
n=46). However, we did find that performance in the critical choice question was 
significantly related to correctly answering the “how long ago” question (C=.281, 
p=.043, n=48).  
Next, we analyzed the relation between remembering what-where-how long 
ago and spontaneous recall. We found that remembering “what” (C=.213, p=.131, 
n=48) and “where” (C=.213, p=.131, n=48) were not significantly related to 
spontaneous recall. However, recalling “what is where” was marginally related to 
spontaneous recall (C=.269, p=.058, n=46), and “how long ago” was positively 
related to spontaneously retrieving what happened a week earlier (C=.313, p=.025, 
n=46).   
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Discussion 
This is the first study to adapt a what-where-how long ago depletion paradigm 
used with non-human animals for preschool children. Our results showed that 3- to 5-
year-olds tended to correctly choose the preferred and perishable food (i.e., popsicle) 
after the short RI but failed to reverse their choice and choose the less preferred and 
non-perishable food (i.e., raisins) after the long RI. Rather, children tended to choose 
the popsicle, regardless of the duration of the RI. Moreover, experiencing the melted 
popsicle in the first trial did not improve children’s performance in the second trial. 
We also tested the extent to which children remembered information about the 
“what,” “where,” and “what is where” of the past events or, the “memory-check” 
questions. Here, we found that older children tended to more accurately remember 
this information than did younger children (though the younger children’s responses 
tended to improve in Trial 2). We also found that both younger and older children had 
difficulties estimating the duration (i.e., “how long ago” question) of the trials and 
their performance in this respect did not improve in Trial 2. 
Spontaneous recall (i.e., amount of information remembered about Trial 1) 
also did not differ in younger and older children, though the salience of the event (i.e., 
popsicle melting in the 1-hour trial) experienced the week before tended to affect 
recall. Finally, we analyzed the relation between the critical choice question, memory-
check and “how long ago” questions, and spontaneous recall and found that children’s 
responses to the critical choice question (i.e., choosing which of the three boxes to 
open) were only related to children’s ability to remember “how long ago” in Trial 2. 
In addition, the ability to spontaneously retrieve what happened a week earlier was 
related to retrieving “what is where” and “how long ago” in Trial 2.  
Critical Choice Questions 
Older children did not outperform younger children on the critical choice 
questions. When collapsing across age, children correctly chose the popsicle on the 
majority of the 3-min trials, but failed to correctly choose raisins on all of the 1-hour 
trials. As such, these findings differ from research showing that non-human animals 
(e.g., Clayton & Dickinson, 1998; Martin-Ordas et al., 2010) take into account the 
length of the RI when making their choices (i.e., preferred food after short intervals, 
less preferred food after long intervals). Because children as young as 3 have an 
understanding of the transformation of certain substances (e.g., ice melts with time) 
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(Gelman, Bullock, & Meck, 1980), it seems unlikely that children in our study 
answered the critical choice question incorrectly in the 1-hour RIs because they 
lacked the “semantic knowledge” that “popsicles melt.” Moreover, even if this lack of 
knowledge accounted for their poor performance in Trial 1, children should have 
acquired this knowledge by Trial 2. Yet, children in the 1 hour-1 hour condition 
performed no better than children in the 3 min-1 hour condition. This is surprising 
given that the goal of depletion paradigms like ours is to measure episodic-like 
memory and, as such, older children would be expected to succeed. 
However, it may be that children’s choices on depletion paradigms is subject 
to a decision-making process in which factors such as which reward children prefer, 
or which reward children obtained the week before, play a more fundamental role 
than episodic memory, per se. For example, children may have conceived the food 
preference test as the critical choice question and once they decided what they “liked 
best” they maintained their choice independently of the RI. Moreover, their food 
preference and critical choice in the second trial may have been influenced by the 
food reward they obtained in Trial 1. For example, those children who chose the 
popsicle in the first 1-hour trial may have decided to choose the popsicle in Trial 2 
because they had not obtained it the first time. Alternatively, those children who 
chose the popsicle in the first 3-min trial may have decided to choose the raisins in 
Trial 2 because they desired something different. These and other hypotheses could be 
tested using an experimental design in which children are provided with the popsicle 
or raisins in Trial 1, independently of the duration of the trial. This is an important 
future direction that would help determine the extent to which depletion paradigms 
used with non-human animals can be adapted for young children. This approach 
would also help to gain better traction on the different types of motivational factors 
that may be operative in children but not in animals, and vice versa, in depletion 
paradigms. 
Memory-check Questions and “How Long Ago” Question 
Similar to the results reported by Hayne and Imuta (2011, see also Bauer et al., 
2016), we found that, overall, older children were better at recalling “what”, “where” 
and “what is where” than younger children. Accordingly, difficulties encoding this 
specific information cannot likely account for why older children, at least, did not 
pass our critical choice question. In contrast, both age groups failed to estimate how 
much time had elapsed between the baiting/hiding event and the point in time when 
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they were asked to choose which box to uncover (i.e., “how long ago” question). 
Thus, failing to estimate the duration of the trial might have diminished children’s 
performance in the critical choice question. Although Hayne and Imuta (2011) found 
that 4-year-olds were successful on the “when” question, “when,” in this case, was 
defined as “in which occasion” [e.g., order of events (Hayne & Imuta, 2011; Holland 
& Smulders, 2011; Eichenbaum, Fortin, Ergorul, Wright, & Agster, 2005)]. It is also 
important to note that it is not until later in development that children can sequence 
past events using timescales (e.g., Pathman et al., 2013a; Pathman et al. 2013b). In 
this regard, our study differs from previous developmental research because we 
closely mirrored the animal research and defined “when” as sensitivity to “how long 
ago” the caching/baiting event took place (Clayton & Dickinson, 1998). As such, it is 
possible that remembering how long ago something happened involves different 
underlying mechanisms (and ones that may be later-developing) than remembering 
the order in which certain events happened. This, too, is an intriguing direction for 
future research given that there exists very little work on how young children’s 
estimations of duration are related to other temporal dimensions such as order. 
With respect to the encoding of duration or, “how long ago,” specifically, it 
may be that it is impacted by such factors as the amount of time that elapses between 
one event and another, as well as event distinctiveness. For example, Friedman and 
his colleagues (Friedman, 1991; Friedman, Gardner & Zubin, 1995) showed that 4- 
and 5-year-olds can accurately estimate how long ago two previously experienced 
events took place when the time between the two events being compared was several 
weeks. In addition, using a spatial metaphor (i.e., ruler or arrows), children as young 
as 4 years of age can indicate how long ago yearly events (e.g. Christmas day) took 
place (Friedman, 2002; Friedman, 2003), as well as events that happened 24 hours, 
one year, or several years ago (Busby Grant & Suddendorf, 2009).  This research 
suggests at least two reasons for why children in our study had difficulty estimating 
the duration of the trials: (1) event salience and, more specifically, hiding snacks is 
likely not as memorable an event as Christmas day, for example; and (2) length of 
time (e.g., 1 hour, in the case of our study, vs. 1 year, in the case of Busby Grant and 
Suddendorf, 2009). Either way, our paradigm highlights the fact that estimating 
duration and, more specifically, using this information to make a correct choice in a 
depletion paradigm is challenging for preschool children. More broadly, this finding 
forces us to consider whether estimating duration (at least as assessed in a depletion 
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paradigm) should be considered an integral feature of episodic memory (cf., 
McCormack, 2001). 
The Element of “Surprise” (i.e., Trial 1) and Learning from Experience (i.e., Trial 
2) 
 Comparative psychologists have argued that deliberate encoding (e.g., use of 
training phases) helps organisms develop expectations of future rewards, thus 
favoring the storing of this information as semantic rather than episodic memories 
(Martin-Ordas, Berntsen, & Call, 2013; Martin-Ordas et al., 2014; Zentall et al., 2008; 
Zentall, Clement, Bhatt, & Allen, 2001; Zhou, Hohmann, & Crystal, 2012). In other 
words, the memory processes involved in a first encounter/trial of an event may differ 
from those involved in subsequent trials. For this reason, we were curious about 
whether children’s performance in Trial 1 would differ from their performance in 
Trial 2 and, moreover, whether the RI (i.e., 3 min or 1 hour) children experienced in 
Trial 1 would influence their responses in Trial 2. For example, if children in the 1 
hour–1 hour condition made use of the information they learned in Trial 1 (i.e., 
popsicles melt after a long duration), they should perform better in Trial 2.  
 As mentioned previously, children’s experience in Trial 1 did not affect their 
performance on the critical choice question in Trial 2. In contrast, we found some 
evidence that younger children’s performance on the memory-check questions 
improved between Trials 1 and 2 (note, that older children’s responses were already 
quite accurate in Trial 1). More specifically, younger children performed worse than 
older children at remembering “what” and “what is where” in Trial 1. Yet, in Trial 2, 
only a difference on the “what is where” question remained (and younger children’s 
performance on the “what” question in Trial 2 was significantly higher than in Trial 1, 
McNemar chi-square: p=0.002) Because the “what” (i.e., popsicle and raisins) is the 
only component that is constant across trials (the locations where we hid the food 
items changed across trials), younger children might have expected that we would ask 
them about the popsicle and raisins in Trial 2 and thus encoded this information in 
semantic rather than episodic memory. In contrast, remembering “what is where” 
might have tapped into children’s capacity to bind the food items to particular 
locations and, by age 5, children have developed the capacity to do so. This is 
interesting in light of arguments that binding contextual features, which facilitates 
event differentiation, is a critical aspect of episodic memory (Eichenbaum et al., 2005; 
Newcombe, Lloyd, & Ratliff, 2007).  
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Spontaneous Recall 
Newcombe, Balcomb, Ferrara, Hansen, and Koski (2014) showed that 
providing 2-year-olds with a cue (e.g., part of the toy they had to find) improved their 
recall. Consequently, presenting children with the physical environment (e.g., room, 
objects)—and not only a single cue—in which they actually experienced the encoding 
event should further help to make memories accessible (Ornstein, 1995; Salmon, 
2001; Pipe, Salmon, & Priestley, 2002). And, indeed, our results on spontaneous 
recall indicate that even younger children were able to remember features of the event 
that took place the week before. Although not statistically significant, we found a 
trend for the effect that event salience had on children’s recollections. More 
specifically, children spontaneously tended to remember more information from the 
1-hour trials (e.g., melted popsicle) as compared to the 3-min trials (e.g., popsicle did 
not melt). Interestingly, we did not find that older children remembered more 
information than younger children. As mentioned in the Introduction, one possibility 
for this lack of age difference is that direct retrieval requires less executive control—
which develops substantially between ages 3 and 5 (Zelazo, Muller, Frye, & 
Marcovitch, 2003)– than generative retrieval. Accordingly, younger children’s access 
to the memory trace may have been facilitated by the number of cues with which we 
presented them. In fact, previous research has shown that providing children as young 
as 3 years of age with real props improves their recall after long delays (i.e., a week) 
relative to other conditions in which they are asked to verbally report a past event 
(Gee & Pipe, 1995; Gordon & Follmer, 1994).  
Relation between our Measures 
Each of the measures used in our study (i.e., critical choice question, memory-
check and how long ago questions, and spontaneous recall) arguably tap some aspect 
of children’s episodic memory, yet showed different age-related patterns and not all 
of them were consistently related. For example, younger children were less successful 
than older children at remembering some of the individual elements of the what-
where-how long ago questions and at integrating the information of “what is where.” 
However, they were just as successful as older children at spontaneously recalling 
information about Trial 1. Although one could argue that spontaneously recalling vs. 
not recalling information does not as readily map onto the labels “correct” vs. 
“incorrect” in the same way as the critical choice or memory check questions do, for 
example, it is nonetheless important to note that what children remembered was 
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accurate. That is, in no instance did a child report something that was completely 
unrelated to the events that transpired the previous week.  
Interestingly, some components of these three measures were related—
although only in Trial 2. For instance, we found that the abilities to remember “what 
is where” and “how long ago” relate to the ability to spontaneously retrieve 
information about Trial 1 suggesting that these measures might tap the same memory 
abilities. Likewise, recalling “how long ago” the baiting event took place was related 
to performance in the critical choice question. This finding suggests that those 
children who correctly estimated the duration of the RI were also the ones who 
correctly answered the critical choice question and, conversely, those children who 
failed to estimate the duration of the RI also failed the critical choice question. What 
is compelling about this finding is that this effect was only true for Trial 2 and, 
consequently, once children knew what the task entailed. Thus, one could argue that 
children do not spontaneously incorporate the duration of the trial into their decisions.  
It is important to note that, despite these results, most of the measures used in 
our study were not significantly related and, as such, it is difficult to argue that they 
reflect the same memory abilities. Indeed, consistent with our findings, two recent 
studies – one with adults (Cheke & Clayton, 2013) and one with children (Cheke & 
Clayton, 2015)- also largely failed to find significant correlations between different 
measures of episodic memory. Thus, the issue of why various tasks that purportedly 
measure “episodic memory” are not related clearly merits further empirical attention.   
Conclusion  
 Our episodic-like memory depletion paradigm showed that younger and older 
preschoolers alike failed to take into account retention interval when deciding whether 
to choose a non-perishable or perishable food. Consistent with previous findings, 
however, our results showed age-related changes in children’s ability to remember 
“what” we hid, “where” we hid it, and “what items were hidden where.” Our findings 
also show that, when provided with the appropriate cues, even younger children 
spontaneously remember information about what happened a week earlier. Finally, 
we found that both age groups in our study had difficulty estimating the duration of 
the trials – a potential explanation for why they failed to make the correct critical 
choice in the depletion paradigm.  
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Figure captions:  
Figure 1. Apparatus used in the what-where-how long task. The photo depicts (a) the 
three cardboard boxes and the wooden platform and (b) a detail of one of three holes 
and plastic netting   
 
Figure 2. Percentage of younger and older children who chose the box hiding the 
popsicle, the box hiding the raisins or the empty box in the critical choice question 
grouped as a function of RI and trial type  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
